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Mobile money is widely seen as a powerful tool for enhancing 
financial inclusion and, potentially, improving the economic 
well-being of the poor. As the mobile money sector, and its 
turnover, have grown, certain governments have increasingly 
viewed mobile money transactions as a potentially convenient 
tax handle. The resulting tax measures are often controversial 
and draw sharp criticism from those who fear that they will 
undermine the growth of digital financial services. 
The case study of Uganda highlights 
an interesting example of this trend and 
demonstrates the importance of careful 
tax policy design. In early 2018, there 
was a consensus that Uganda’s tax effort 
remained some way below its revenue 
potential, and there was pressure to find 
new revenue sources. In July 2018, the 
government introduced an especially 
contentious new tax of 1 per cent on the 
value of all mobile money transactions, 
one of several excise duty amendments 
designed to increase revenue from the 
telecommunications and financial sectors. After widespread 
public outcry and significant implementation challenges, the 
tax was amended in November 2018 to apply only to mobile 
money withdrawals at a rate of 0.5 per cent. 
In our paper, we argue that the tax policymaking process 
in relation to this tax failed at several stages, leading to 
the implementation of an ultimately flawed and unpopular 
measure. This is, to our knowledge, one of the only papers 
to take the approach of examining a specific example of the 
tax policymaking process in a low-income country. 
The Ugandan tax policymaking process
Tax policy development in Uganda follows a series of distinct 
phases closely linked to the annual budget cycle, and is 
tightly controlled by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development (MFPED). Unusually, this measure 
emerged on the initiative of the President’s Office, in March 
2018, towards the end of the normal budget cycle. As the 
policy direction had been decided at the highest political 
level, policymakers were obliged to follow rather than to 
lead. The final budget must be approved before 31 May, and 
so a new direction emerging in March leaves scant time for 
rigorous analysis. Nevertheless, officials from the MFPED 
did attempt to produce objective, technical analysis to show 
that the measure, as originally conceived, was unsuitable 
and to offer alternatives. Various consultations were held 
with key stakeholders to gather their views, although the 
scope of these consultations was possibly too narrow. The 
evidence produced did not significantly 
influence the policy direction, and despite 
concerns, the measure was approved by 
the Cabinet and passed to Parliament. 
The resulting Excise Duty Amendment Bill 
was first read in Parliament on 3 April and 
passed at its second reading. The normal 
tax policymaking process did not seem 
robust enough to withstand the political 
and revenue pressures of the moment.
There was immediate public outcry 
following the introduction of the tax on 1 
July. Civil society organisations, journalists, 
students, and activists mobilised protests 
and demonstrations. Implementation was difficult and erratic. 
As per the legislation, the tax was initially imposed up to four 
times on one mobile money transfer (depositing, sending, 
receiving, and withdrawing mobile money were all treated as 
separate transactions). Such a misapplication should have 
been ironed out in the drafting process. The President issued 
a statement that the 1 per cent rate was an error, and that 
the tax should only apply to withdrawals, contributing to 
further confusion. An amendment was introduced in Parliament 
to halve the rate and limit the tax to withdrawals, with these 
changes implemented in November. The implementation 
issues demonstrate the value that consultation, industry 
knowledge, and the practical experience of tax administrators, 
can bring to policy development.
The tax was ultimately successful in raising revenue, with 
total revenue collections in FY 2018/19 137 per cent of the 
original target (Uganda Revenue Authority 2019). However, 
in FY 2019/20 the tax under-performed relative to forecasts, 
collecting 36 per cent less than in the previous financial year 
(Uganda Revenue Authority 2020).
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     A well-engineered 
process does not 
guarantee good outcomes, 
but by establishing key 
fundamentals, 
governments can make 
better policy outcomes 
more likely, and 
significantly decrease the 
risk of avoidable, costly, 
errors in policy design.
Where did the process fail?
Several critical steps in the tax policymaking 
process were truncated or missed 
completely, undermining the process. 
Firstly, the policy process was not robust 
enough to withstand political pressures. 
The technical sphere of government 
succumbed to these pressures, rushing 
through an inappropriate measure without 
proper examination. Policy development, 
which usually takes several months, 
was compressed into about two weeks, 
undermining the ability of officials to gather 
evidence, analyse the proposal, and 
develop viable alternatives. 
Secondly, tax policymakers failed to give 
politicians confidence that their concerns 
were being addressed. The lack of a 
clear medium-term vision for tax policy had 
fostered a policymaking environment that is 
accepting of short-term measures to plug 
budgetary gaps. This can leave tax policy 
feeling merely reactive without defined 
objectives of its own. 
Thirdly, opportunities to properly incorporate 
stakeholder views and concerns were 
missed or wasted. Time pressure meant that 
stakeholder consultation was particularly 
lacking, with civil society and the private 
sector almost entirely excluded. Stronger 
consultations may have enabled better 
understanding of the likely impact of the tax, 
avoiding costly adjustment. However, this 
tax does present an unusually successful 
example of tax bargaining, the process 
of negotiation between taxpayers and 
government, and of public actors influencing 
tax policy. In response to widespread 
protest, the government reduced the tax 
rate and restricted the base. 
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Figure 1 Mobile money tax timeline
What does good tax 
policymaking look like?
This case study offers valuable lessons in 
effective tax policymaking. We highlight four 
areas which, when functioning well, can lead 
to stronger proposals and better outcomes. 
➜ Use a medium-term agenda for tax 
policy: this serves to align the political and 
technical spheres of government and, by 
establishing a vision, improves predictability. 
In this case, the emphasis on plugging 
an immediate budget gap contributed to 
weaknesses in policy development. 
➜ Establish and publicise a robust 
tax policy process: a well-documented 
process, with a clear timetable, commits tax 
policymakers to a standard and systematic 
approach to all significant policy issues and 
reduces the scope for bypassing due process. 
➜ Adopt rigorous policy appraisal 
standards: policy appraisal should be 
prioritised early on, to understand the full 
likely impact of proposals. Strong tax policy 
design needs to consider not only the likely 
revenue impact, but also equity, efficiency, 
and administrability. 
➜ Create a two-way bridge between 
the political and technical spheres of 
government: formalising links through 
the establishment of an advisor can be 




























































































































































































































This paper highlights the risks posed by 
shortcomings in Uganda’s current approach 
to tax policymaking. A well-engineered 
process does not guarantee good outcomes, 
but by establishing a few key fundamentals, 
governments can make better policy outcomes 
more likely, and significantly decrease the risk of 
avoidable, often costly, errors in policy design.
